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INTRODUCTION

Using federal funds made available to state and local educational agencies, New York City instituted a program providing
supplementary instruction to educationally-deprived children.1
Over thirteen percent of the program's eligible recipients attended
nonpublic, predominantly parochial schools. The program provided children from low income families with remedial instruction
in reading, mathematics, and English. In addition, it provided
needy students with clinical guidance services. 2 The teachers and
other professionals involved in the program were all public employees. Instruction and services were provided at nonpublic school
facilities during the regular school day. Supervisory personnel
monitored the instruction and services for religious content by regularly visiting the schools, unannounced. In 1978, six taxpayers
challenged the program.3 They asserted that it violated the establishment clause of the first amendment, and sought to enjoin fed1. The statute authorized the states' use of federal funds for programs for educationally-deprived children. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982). Section 2734(a) provided:
A local educational agency may use funds received under this subchapter only
for programs and projects which are designated to meet the special educational
needs of [educationally-deprived children]. Such programs and projects may include the acquisition of equipment, payments to teachers of amounts in excess
of regular salary schedules as a bonus for service in schools serving project areas,
the training of teachers, and, where necessary, the construction of school facilities, and planning for such programs and, projects.
20 U.S.C. § 2734(a). Section 2740 required local agencies to provide students enrolled in
private schools with similar equal programs. 20 U.S.C. § 2740.
2. As part of the program, New York City hired teachers, psychiatrists, psychologists,
guidance counselors, and social workers to provide clinical guidance services and remedial
instruction. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232, 3235 (1985).
3. Felton v. Department of Educ., No. 78 Civ. 1750 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1983), rev'd, 739
F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
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eral and city governments from funding the program. The suit was
delayed pending the outcome of a similar challenge in a New York
district court." When it resumed, the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.6 On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit unanimously reversed the district court, holding that the establishment clause "constitutes an
insurmountable barrier to the use of federal funds" to finance New
York's nonpublic school aid program.6 On certiorari, the Supreme
Court of the United States held, affirmed: The first amendment
proscribes the use of federal funds to pay the salaries of public
employees that provide remedial instruction and guidance counseling to nonpublic school students at parochial school facilities.
7
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
The Supreme Court of the United States has often recognized
the inherent conflict between the establishment clause8 and the
free exercise guarantee of the first amendment.' While the establishment clause requires the government to remain neutral in religious matters, the free exercise clause precludes the government
from interfering with the individual's religious freedom. Government neutrality at times can hinder an individual's religious practice.10 This conflict is often compounded where the government is
obliged to simultaneously and nondiscriminatorily advance the
general welfare, 1 and yet refrain from sponsoring, financially sup4. The suit was delayed because a New York district court was deciding an identical
challenge in National Coalition for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Harris, 489 F. Supp.
1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 808 (1980). When the Supreme Court of
the United States dismissed the Harris appeal for want of jurisdiction, the New York taxpayers revived their challenge. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3236.
5. Felton v. Department of Educ., No. 78 Civ. 1750 (E.D.N.Y. October 20, 1983).
6. Felton v. Department of Educ., 739 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir. 1984).
7. Justice Brennan delivered the Court's opinion. He was joined by Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion expanding on the political entanglement issue raised by the majority. Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3239. See infra note 34
and accompanying text (discussing political entanglement). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and White wrote separate dissenting opinions. 105 S. Ct. at
3242, 3243, 3249.
8. The religion clauses provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-71 (1970); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-2 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Freedom v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
788-89 (1973); see Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation:The ConstitutionalDilemma of the
First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REv. 561, 574 (1980).
11. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); cf. Wheeler v. Barrera, 417
U.S. 402 (1974) (holding that although Title I programs provided to public and nonpublic
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porting, or actively involving itself in religious activities. Nowhere
is this dilemma more apparent than in the nonpublic school aid
programs."
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Over the years, the Court has used various analytical tools to
decide establishment clause cases. Although the Lemon v. Kurtzman" three-part test has been most prominent, at times the Court
has completely ignored it.' 4 Instead, it has occasionally applied either the historical15 or benefit approach. 6 Nonetheless, since
school students must be "comparable," states are not obliged to provide identical educational programs to nonpublic school students.)
12. The controversial school aid issue applies to both elementary and secondary
schools. The Court has upheld programs aiding church-affiliated institutions of higher education. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (upholding state subsidies
to religious colleges and universities offering degrees in nonreligious as well as religious disciplines); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding state bond issue to finance construction for sectarian schools of higher education); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971) (upholding state loans to sectarian colleges and universities for construction of facilities to be used strictly for secular education).
The Court has distinguished church-affiliated institutions of higher learning from parochial schools on three bases. First, university students are "less impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (footnote omitted). Second,
religious indoctrination is not the primary purpose of church-affiliated institutions of higher
learning. Id. at 687. Finally, many sectarian related universities and colleges subscribe to a
high degree of academic freedom that encourages the nonsectarian study of secular disciplines. Id. at 686. These differences decrease the likelihood that state aid will primarily
advance religion and lessen the need for surveillance to ensure that such aid is strictly secular. See also Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 19 (1978-1979) ("[Tlhe Court
has made it quite clear that both the national and state governments are free to dispense
large sums of money to these colleges and universities, so long as the moneys are not directly used for sectarian purposes.").
13. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see infra text accompanying notes 25-34 (discussing
Lemon).
14. For recent commentaries discussing the Lemon test and its application in nonpublic
school aid cases, see Levinson, Separationof Church and State: And the Wall Came Tumbling Down, 18 VAL. UL. REV. 707 (1984); Note, Rebuilding the Wall: The Case for a Return to the Strict Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1463
(1981); Note, State Aid to ParochialSchools: A Quantitative Analysis, 71 GEO. L.J. 1063
(1983); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14-8 to -12 (1978).
15. Under the historical approach, the Court, primarily motivated by the length of time
the challenged practice has continued, will uphold the practice. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 104
S. Ct. 1355 (1984) (upholding a city's inclusion of a nativity scene in its Christmas display);
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding the Nebraska legislature's practice of beginning each day with a prayer recited by a Presbyterian minister does not violate establishment clause); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding property tax exemptions
for religious properties used for worship). Although the Court has indicated that a long
history will not render constitutional an otherwise prohibited involvement between church
and state, the resilience of the practice is significant: "[A]n unbroken practice [continued]
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Lemon, the Court has consistently used this three-part test to determine the constitutionality of school aid programs. 17 To meet the
Lemon requirements, a statute that grants aid to parochial schools
must: (1) have a secular purpose; 18 (2) have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not excessively entangle church and state.' 9 The Court's varying results are not attributable to disagreement among the Justices over which standard
to apply, but to disagreement over how to apply it.2 0 The "entanglement" prong of the test has proven to be a major source of conflict on the Court.2 '
openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to
be lightly cast aside." Walz, 397 U.S. at 678; see also Recent Developments-The Lemon
Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1175, 1202 (1984) ("The Court's continued use of the new historical approach threatens not
only uniformity in establishment clause jurisprudence under the Lemon test, but also the
fundamental first amendment protections that the traditional approach has secured.").
16. The benefit approach refers to the Court's concern over who receives the benefit of
the state aid. Applying the benefit approach, if the parochial school students or their parents benefit directly and the sectarian schools benefit only incidentally, then the program is
constitutional. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 360-62 (1975); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947). See

generally R. CORD,

SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

105-24 (1982) (discussing the "child

benefit" theory).
17. Prior to Lemon the Court decided two important parochial school aid cases. In Everson v. Board of Educ., the Court upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing local school
districts to reimburse school students' parents for the cost of bus transportation to and from
school. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Court stated, "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." Id. at 18. In spite of the Court's strict establishment clause
posture it upheld the reimbursement program because the program benefitted the students'
parents and not the sectarian schools. Id.
In Board of Educ. v. Allen, the Court upheld a New York statute authorizing local
school districts to loan secular textbooks to all seventh through twelfth grade students, including students attending parochial schools. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court held that because "no funds or books [were] furnished to parochial schools and the financial benefit
[was] to parents and children, not to schools," the program did not violate the establishment clause. Id. at 243-44. See supra note 16 (discussion of the Court's benefit approach).
18. Parochial school aid programs routinely pass the "secular purpose" prong of the
Lemon criteria. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). But cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479 (1985) ("secular purpose" test invalidated state-authorized moment of silence in public
schools).
19. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon Court identified two types of entanglement:
administrative and political entanglement. Id. at 620-22. Administrative entanglement pertains to the interaction between church and state necessary to ensure that the state aid
neither advances nor inhibits religion. Id. For a discussion of political entanglement, see
infra note 32 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
21. For commentaries discussing the court's entanglement doctrine, see Schotten, The
Establishment Clause and Excessive Governmental-Religious Entanglement: The Constitutional Status of Aid to Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Schools Schools, 15 WAKE
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The "excessive entanglement" concern first emerged in Walz
v. Tax Commission.22 Although the Walz Court identified only administrative entanglement, 3 in subsequent decisions it expanded
the concept to include political entanglement. 4 One year after
Walz, in Lemon,25 the Court adopted and breathed life into the
entanglement language. It became the permanent, third part of establishment clause analysis.
Lemon involved a challenge to the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania nonpublic school aid programs, which had similar provisions.
The Rhode Island statute 26 authorized supplementary salaries for
parochial school teachers. The Pennsylvania statute27 authorized
reimbursement of parochial schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. Both statutes limited aid to
secular instruction and required the nonpublic schools to maintain
comprehensive accounts for state inspection, separating the cost of
secular and religious education. Using the "excessive entanglement" portion of its newly-devised test, the Court held that both
programs violated the establishment clause.2 8
The Court used an abstract analysis that was destined to pervade its future parochial school aid decisions. The Court invaliFOREST L. REV. 207 (1979); Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a Constitutional Evaluation of Church-State Contacts, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PuoBs. 143 (1981); Note,
The Forbidden Fruit of Church-State Contacts: The Role of Entanglement Theory in Its
Ripening, 16 SUFFOLK UL. REV. 725 (1982); Comment, Cessation of the Excessive Entanglement Test and the Establishment of Religion, 7 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 975 (1980). See generally
Shortt, The Establishment Clause and Religion-Based Categories: Taking Entanglement
Seriously, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 145 (1982) (discussing the development of the entanglement doctrine and its effect on religion oriented classification by the Internal Revenue
Code).
22. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). In Walz, the Court upheld New York's property tax exemption for sectarian organizations on property used for worship. Although the Court was
primarily concerned with the long history of tax exempt status for religious organizations,
the Court also considered whether the exemption led to excessive entanglement between
church and state. See supra note 15. The Court determined that "the exemption [created]
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state." 397 U.S. at 676.
23. Id. at 674-75.
24. See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing political entanglement).
25. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
26. Education: Salary Supplements to Nonpublic Schoolteachers, 1969 R.I. Pub. Laws
246 (codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 16-51-1 to -9 & subsequently repealed by 1980 R.I. Pub.
Laws 395).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 §§ 5601-5608 (Purdon 1971) (repealed 1977).
28. 403 U.S. at 619-22. The Lemon Court concluded: "A comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that [state funds are
not used to advance religion] and the First Amendment [is] otherwise respected. . . . These
prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between state and
church." Id. at 619.
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dated the statutes in the absence of evidence that the subsidized
teachers were injecting religion into their teaching, either inadvertently or in bad faith.2 9 It held that "the potential for impermissible fostering of religion"30 was sufficient to invalidate the programs. 3 1 The state had a duty to be certain that the statesponsored teachers did not proselytize.32 Both statutes failed because the Court found that the level of surveillance necessary to
ensure with certainty that the states did not foster religion would
inevitably lead to an excessive entanglement between church and
state.
The Lemon Court identified another form of entanglement fatal to school programs-political entanglement.3 3 The Court used
the term "political entanglement" to refer to the political division
along religious lines caused by government support of sectarian
schools. The Court explained that as different religious groups vie
for increased aid, the electorate would become embroiled in a religious struggle. According to the Court, this struggle would ultimately threaten the democratic process. Because parochial school
aid could lead to political division along religious lines, these statutes violated the establishment clause. 4
Lemon created more questions than answers. The decision
made it clear that the "entanglement" test would invalidate statutes requiring continuing state involvement with parochial schools.
It seemed, however, that if a state could devise an aid program
that required little or no state involvement, it would be constitutional. State legislators were faced with a dilemma-how to give
parochial schools secular aid without becoming excessively entangled with the religious institutions?
New York thought it had the answer. It passed school aid stat29. 403 U.S. at 618-19.
30. Id. at 619.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 622.
34. Id. at 622-23.
The Court has often used political entanglement as an additional ground for invalidating school aid programs. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975); Committee
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Freedom v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-98 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1971). The Court, however, has never invalidated a program strictly on the basis of political entanglement. Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1364
(1984). See generally Note, Political Entanglement as an Independent Test of Constitutionality Under the Establishment Clause, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1209 (1984) (suggesting the
Court elevate the political entanglement criterion to an independent fourth prong of the

Lemon analysis).
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utes which were challenged in Committee for Public Education
and Religious Freedom v. Nyquist. s5 The statutes authorized: (1)
direct grants to nonpublic schools for the maintenance and repair
of school facilities; (2) tuition reimbursement to low income families; and (3) tax relief for families failing to qualify for the tuition
reimbursement program. 6 Attempting to avoid the Lemon fate,
the drafters did not require any state surveillance or auditing.
The second prong of the Lemon test was fatal to all three
phases of the program." Because the state could not be certain
that parochial schools would use the aid for strictly secular purposes, the Court determined that the aid had the primary effect of
advancing religion. 38 Consequently, the program was
39
unconstitutional.
Paradoxically, although Nyquist did not involve administrative entanglement, it proved to be extremely instructional on the
issue. The Court's opinion implied that had the program mandated
the level of surveillance necessary to satisfy the "primary effect"
test, it still would have failed the "entanglement" test. Instead, the
statute provided no scrutiny of the program and failed the "primary effect" test.'0 Legislators realized that only a tightrope separated the "primary effect" and "entanglement" prongs of the
Lemon test.
Pennsylvania attempted to constitutionally aid parochial
schools by enacting two statutes 41 which together provided non35. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
36. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 549(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (authorizing grants to nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 562 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85)
(authorizing tuition reimbursement to low income families); N.Y. TAx LAW § 612(j) (McKinney 1975) (authorizing tax relief to families failing to qualify for tuition reimbursement).
37. See 413 U.S. at 798.
38. Id. at 774, 798.
39. The Court discounted the state's argument that the tax credit and reimbursement
benefitted the parents and not the schools. The Court found that the parents received the
funds as an incentive to send their children to nonpublic schools; thus the schools ultimately
derived the benefit. Id. at 786. Compare supra note 16 (discussing the Court's benefit approach), with Nyquist. Although Nyquist turned on the "primary effect" issue, the Court
felt compelled to address "political entanglement." The Court restated the Lemon Court's

concern that involvement between church and state would cause political devisiveness. 413
U.S. at 796-98.
40. Justice Rehnquist would later describe the Court's entanglement doctrine as a
"'Catch-22' paradox of its own creation." Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. at 3243 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. Education, § 9-973 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (authorizing provision of
instructional material and equipment); id. at § 9-972.1 (authorizing provision of auxillary
services).
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public schools with instructional material, equipment, 42 and auxil-

iary services.4" The auxiliary services permitted public employees
to teach and counsel parochial school students at nonpublic school
facilities. The statute did not require the state to monitor the pro44 the Court held that both aspects of
gram. In Meek v. Pittenger,
the program were unconstitutional; the instructional material was
unconstitutional because it primarily advanced religion, and the
auxiliary services were unconstitutional because the state could not
be certain that they did not primarily advance religion.45
The Court noted the state's argument that provision of auxiliary services by public employees reduced the need for surveillance, but found the argument constitutionally insignificant." It
concluded instead that because the state employees worked in the
religious environment of parochial schools, the state could not be
'47
certain that the "subsidized teachers [did] not inculcate religion.
Meek was significant because the Court did not end its inquiry
at the "primary effect" issue. Instead, it made explicit what the
Nyquist Court had merely implied; the Court determined that the
level of state scrutiny required to ensure that aid to sectarian
schools was purely secular would lead to "a constitutionally intolerable degree of entanglement between church and state.

' 48

Meek

put state legislators on notice that the Court would apply strict
"entanglement" analysis to programs aiding parochial schools. To
pass the "primary effect" and "entanglement" prongs of the
Lemon test, parochial school aid would have to be strictly confined
42. The instructional material and equipment provided by the state included such
items as maps, photographs, globes, films, and recording equipment. 421 U.S. at 355 n.4.
43. The auxiliary services included remedial and therapeutic psychological, speech, and
hearing services. Id. at 352-53. The program also authorized the loan of textbooks, which the
Court upheld on the basis of Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See supra note 17
(discussing Allen).
44. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
45. Id. at 366, 372.
46. Id. at 371-72.
47. Id. at 371 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619). The Court stated:
The fact that the teachers and counselors providing auxiliary services are employees of the public intermediate unit, rather than of the church-related schools
in which they work, does not substantially eliminate the need for continuing
surveilance. . . .[T]hey are performing important educational services in schools
in which education is an integral part of the dominant sectarian mission and in
which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained. The potential for impermissible fostering of religion under
these circumstances, although somewhat reduced, is nonetheless present.
Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted).
48. 421 U.S. at 370.
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to secular functions and not require ongoing monitoring.
Proponents of parochial school aid had their first breakthrough in Wolman v. Walter.4 9 The Court appeared to alter its
"entanglement" approach. In Wolman, the Court upheld sections
of an Ohio statute"0 providing nonpublic schools with: (1) diagnostic services 5 performed at nonpublic schools; (2) therapeutic services 52 provided at public facilities; and (3) standardized tests and
test scoring services.53 The Court reaffirmed the Lemon test, but it
quietly changed the "entanglement" criterion. It acknowledged
that a diagnostic therapist paid by the state and attending to students at a parochial school may impart ideological views.5 In spite
of this possibility, the Court concluded that because this danger
was slight, the program required no monitoring. Unlike Meek, the
state was no longer obliged to be certain that aid was and remained strictly secular. 5 Unlike Lemon,51 the state could now rely
on its employees' good faith and ability to refrain from any religious interaction with the parochial school students and their
57
administrators.
If Wolman began a trend, Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty v. Regan5 expanded upon it. The Regan
Court upheld a New York statute" directing the State Commissioner to reimburse nonpublic schools for the costs incurred in
complying with state-required student evaluation testing.6 0 In ad49. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
50. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page 1976).
51. Id. at § 3317.06(D),(E),(F) (current version at § 3317.06(B),(C),(D)).
52. Id. at § 3317.06(G),(H),(I),(J) (current version at § 3317.06(E),(F),(G),(I)).
53. Id. at § 3317.06(J) (current version at (H)). The state supplied the nonpublic
schools with the identical standardized evaluation tests used in public schools and paid for
an independent organization to grade the tests. The state also loaned textbooks to students,
and authorized the state to pay for field trip transportation. Id. at § 3317.06(A),(L) (Page
1976) (Q 3317.06(L) repealed by 1977 Ohio Laws 834). The Court upheld the textbook loans,
but held the transportation funding unconstitutional because it primarily advanced religion.
433 U.S. at 254-55.
54. See 433 U.S. at 241-42.
55. Id. at 244. Compare Wolman with supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing
Meek's requirement of certainty regarding the states' neutrality).
56. See supra text accompanying note 27.
57. See 433 U.S. at 244.
58. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
59. 1974 N.Y. Laws 507, amended by 1974 N.Y. Laws 508.
60. Nonpublic school teachers administered and scored the tests. The state reimbursed
the schools for the portion of the teachers' time spent complying with the state's testing
requirements. Although the Court emphasized that the state required the tests, it was apparent that nonpublic schools had to administer the tests to be permitted to operate. Consequently, the reimbursement constituted direct financial support of parochial schools. 444
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dition, the statute included strict auditing procedures to guarantee
that the state was paying only for the testing. 1
Regan continued the shift in the Court's establishment clause
analysis. The decision was especially significant for four reasons.
First, it marked the first time the Court upheld direct financial
support for parochial schools. Second, it established the presumption that the religious and secular aspects of parochial education
were separable.6 2 Third, it indicated that the Court would require
evidence of parochial schools' or public employees' bad faith before
it would invalidate nonpublic school aid statutes." Finally, like
Wolman, it summarily dismissed the entanglement issue by concluding that there was no substantial danger of entanglement."'
The Regan Court made it clear that the potential danger of
diverted state funds or church and state entanglement would be
insufficient to sustain an establishment clause challenge. After Regan, state programs would be presumptively valid. The Court
would require specific evidence, not abstract potential dangers, to
rebut that presumption. 5
Armed with Wolman and Regan, proponents of increased parochial school aid no doubt felt confident that the Court in Aguilar
v. Felton66 would overrule Lemon and its progeny. They were
mistaken.
III.

ANALYSIS OF

Aguilar v. Felton

Aguilar v. Felton represents a forceful return to the establishment clause principles many thought were waning.6 7 In particular,
U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. See 1974 N.Y. Laws 507 §§ 3-7.
62. See 444 U.S. at 660.
63. Id. at 660-61.
64. The Court concluded:
The reimbursement process, furthermore, is straightforward and susceptible to
the routinization that characterizes most reimbursement schemes. On its face,
therefore, the New York plan suggests no excessive entanglement, and we are
not prepared to read into the plan as an inevitability the bad faith upon which
any future excessive entanglement would be predicated.
Id. at 660-61 (footnote omitted).
65. Mueller v. Allen followed the Regan decision. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). Mueller involved
a Minnesota tax deduction for both public and nonpublic school tuition. MINN. STAT. §
290.09(22) (1982), repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws 342 art. 1 § 44. Although the parents of
parochial students benefitted most from the statute, the Court upheld it based on the Regan
Court's interpretation of the Lemon criteria. Like Wolman and Regan, the Mueller Court
summarily dismissed the entanglement issue. 463 U.S. at 403.

66. 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
67. For commentaries addressing the Court's weakening entanglement posture after
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Aguilar reversed the Regan trend toward neutralizing the "entanglement" criterion. In deciding Aguilar, the Court ignored its most
recent precedents,6 8 and instead reembraced the Lemon "entanglement" analysis. Significantly, the Court reversed the Regan Court's
recently-created presumptions. First, it dispelled the notion that
the religious and secular aspects of parochial school education are
separable.69 It concluded, as the Meek Court did, that the dominant concern of parochial schools is with providing students with
an overall religious education. Second, the Court did not require
evidence of diverted government funds before the Court could apply the "entanglement" test.7 1 The Court indicated that "[i]f any
significant number of the Title I schools create the [risk]" 2 of federally-funded religious instruction, then the entanglement doctrine
applies. Finally, the Court reestablished that public employees'
good faith is irrelevant.
The Court concluded that without extensive, ongoing monitoring, the city could not be certain that the federally-funded teachers, in the religious environment, would not inject sectarian ideolMueller, see Note, Constitutionalityof State Tax Deductions for Private School Tuition: A
New Door in the Wall of Separation, 63 NEB. L. REV. 572 (1984); Comment, Permissible
State Aid to ParochialSchools: A Plea for Neutrality, 33 EMORY L.J. 487 (1984); Comment,
Mueller v. Allen: Tuition Tax Relief and the Original Intent, 7 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 551

(1984); Comment, Mueller v. Allen: The Continued Weakening of the Separation Between
Church and State, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 (1984); Comment, Aid to ParochialSchools: A
Free Exercise Perspective, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 587, 592-93 (1983); Case Comment, A
Breach in the Impregnable Wall: An Analysis of Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903 (1984). For commentaries after Regan, see Note,
Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Establishment Clause-State Aid to Parochial
Schools-Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 915 (1981); Note, Public Aid to Private Schools: Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 34 Sw. L.J. 1261 (1981); Recent Developments, Constitutional
Law-First Amendment-Establishment Clause-Direct Public Aid to Secular Educational
Function of ParochialSchools, 48 TENN. L. REV. 127 (1980).
68. The majority opinion in Aguilar never mentioned Regan, Wolman, or Mueller, the
Court's most recent decisions addressing parochial school aid. Commentators had viewed all
three decisions as liberalizing the Court's previously strict entanglement doctrine. See supra
note 67.
69. See 105 S.Ct. at 3238.
70. The Court described parochial schools as "schools in which education is an integral
part of the dominant sectarian mission and in which an atmosphere dedicated to the advancement of religious belief is constantly maintained." Id. (quoting Meek, 421 U.S. at 371).
71. Compare Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. 3232, with Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682 (differing level of
specificity of evidence required to invalidate an aid program for parochial school and institutions of higher learning).
Justice O'Connor criticized the majority, indicating that the Court should require evidence of impermissible proselytizing before finding the program unconstitutional. 105 S. Ct.
at 3246-47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 3238 n.8.
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ogy into their instruction. 3 The Court did not indicate whether
New York City's monitoring procedures guaranteed the mandated
level of certainty. Instead, it held that by following those procedures the city became excessively entangled in church affairs.74
The Court determined that if government aid was likely to advance religion or require excessive administrative entanglement to
ensure that it did not, then the program was unconstitutional.
Once again, states "must be certain '75 not to sponsor religion.
Most aspects of the Aguilar decision are not novel, but merely
follow the Lemon entanglement analysis. The Court, however, introduced a nuance in its reasoning that may have increased relevance in future decisions. Prior to Aguilar, entanglement analysis
primarily involved establishment clause violations. The Court perceived state support for religion as an impermissible step toward
the creation of a state-supported, sectarian ideology. 6 In Aguilar,
the Court reintroduced the guarantee of the free exercise clause as
part of the entanglement analysis. 77 The Court indicated that entanglement between parochial schools and the state impermissibly
78
inhibited the schools' religious freedom.
73. Id. at 3238-39.
74. The Court concluded: "This pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian schools infringes precisely those Establishment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive entanglement." Id. at 3238.
75. Id. at 3240 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371
(1975)).
76. In Lemon, the Court recognized that excessive church and state entanglement leads
to "a relationship pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction of church
schools and hence of churches." 403 U.S. at 620. The Court continued: "[W]e cannot ignore
here the danger that pervasive modern governmental power will ultimately intrude on religion and thus conflict with the Religion Clauses." Id. Although the Lemon Court held that
an excessive entanglement between church and state impermissibly interferes with the
churches' religious freedcm, the Court ignored the entanglement aspect of the free exercise
clause in its subsequent decisions. E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349 (1975); cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689 (1971) (including the free exercise clause as part of its Lemon analysis and concluding that the religious freedom of the
parties challenging an aid program was not compromised because their taxes were used to
finance the program). See generally Pfeffer, Freedom and/or Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L. REV. 561 (1980) (discussing the argument made by some parents that the government, by not sponsoring parochial schools, violates their religious freedom).
77. See 105 S. Ct. at 3237, 3239.
78. See id. at 3239.
The Court identified two bases underlying the free exercise clause prohibition of entanglement. First, "[w]hen the state becomes enmeshed with a given denomination in matters of
religious significance, the freedom of religious belief of those who are not adherents of that
denomination suffers." Id. at 3237. Second, "the freedom of even the adherents of the de-
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The free exercise guarantee may prove to be a powerful addition to the Lemon criteria. Nonpublic school aid programs, which
may have been upheld under Lemon, Nyquist, and Meek, may fail
after Aguilar. A program that manages to squeeze past the "primary effect" and "excessive entanglement" criteria may now be
unconstitutional because the program restricts church-controlled
schools in violation of the churches' religious freedom. Legislators
may now find the free exercise language to be a further impediment in their struggle to aid nonpublic schools.
IV.

IMPACT OF

Aguilar v. Felton

Aguilar will have a substantial impact on subsequent cases.
Lower courts are sure to see the case as prohibiting almost all nonpublic school aid. Legislators and parochial schools will find themselves back in the post-Lemon era. They can derive some comfort,
however, in knowing that the Aguilar79 decision attracted only a
bare majority of the Court's members.
nomination is limited by the governmental intrusion into sacred matters." Id.
79. Only five members of the Court supported the majority opinion. See supra note 7.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion enlarged on the political entanglement issue which the
majority raised. 105 S. Ct. at 3240-41 (Powell, J., concurring); see also supra note 34 and
accompanying text (discussing political entanglement). Justice Powell noted the state and
federal governments' dilemma in attempting to aid nonpublic schools; he implied that a
program aiding public and nonpublic schools equally and requiring no monitoring would be
constitutional. Id. at 3241-42.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, opined that state action violates the establishment
clause only when "the statute or practice is a step towards establishing a state religion." Id.
at 3242 (Burger C.J., dissenting). Criticizing the majority's "obsession" with the Lemon test
and emphasizing the program's importance to children afflicted with learning disorders, the
Chief Justice determined that New York City's program did not lead to the creation of a
state supported religious ideology. Chief Justice Burger, therefore, found it constitutional.
Id.
Referring to the majority's entanglement doctrine as a "'Catch-22' paradox," Justice
Rehnquist dissented on the basis of his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct.
2479, 2508 (1985) (Rehnquist J., dissenting). Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. at 3243 (Rehnquist J., dissenting). In Wallace the court held that a state authorized moment of silence in public
schools violated the establishment clause. Dissenting in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's historical analysis of the establishment clause. 105 S. Ct. at 2518. Justice
Rehnquist determined that the framers intended only that the state be precluded from preferring or choosing one religion over another and not that the state be strictly neutral. Id. at
2520. Consequently, according to Justice Rehnquist, any program providing nondiscriminatory aid to sectarian groups is constitutional. See id. at 2520.
Justice O'Connor wrote a separate opinion in which she questioned the usefulness of
the court's entanglement doctrine. 105 S. Ct. at 3246-47 (O'Connor J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor blamed the entanglement prong of the Lemon test for the Court's "anomalous
results," and she suggested that the Court limit its establishment clause doctrine to the
"secular purpose" and "primary effect" prongs of the Lemon test. See id. at 3248.
Justice White dissented on the basis of his dissenting opinions in Lemon v. Kurtzman,
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The Court has been seriously divided in all of its major decisions concerning nonpublic school aid.80 Justice White noted this
division and wrote for the majority in Regan: "Establishment
clause cases are not easy; they stir deep feelings; and we are divided among ourselves, perhaps reflecting the different views on
this subject of the people of this country.""
At the Supreme Court level, the predictive value of Aguilar is
questionable. Both sides of the issue have ardent supporters.8 2 Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun favor restricting
state support for nonpublic schools; Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, and O'Connor support increased financial
support for parochial schools. Justice Powell, frequently casting
the deciding vote, holds the key." Although Aguilar appears to be
a forceful return to Lemon entanglement principles, its resilience
depends almost entirely on Justice Powell. 8 4 Future Supreme
403 U.S. 602, 661 (1971) (White J., dissenting) and Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Freedom v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813 (1973) (White J., dissenting). In Lemon, Justice
White criticized the Court's abstract analysis and suggested that the Court refrain from
invalidating parochial school programs absent specific evidence of state-subsidized religious
indoctrination. 403 U.S. at 670-71 (White J., dissenting). In Nyquist, Justice White emphasized the important role parochial schools play in elementary and secondary education and
characterized the Court's decision as "contrary to the long-range interests of the country."
413 U.S. at 820 (White J., dissenting).
80. See School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) (parochial school teachers paid by
the state to teach as part-time public employees held unconstitutional by a five to four
margin); Mveller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state tuition cost tax deduction upheld by a
five to four majority); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 644
(1980) (parochial school reimbursement for state-mandated testing and reporting upheld by
a five to four margin); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (textbook loans to parochial
school students upheld by a six to three margin, instructional material and equipment loans
to parochial schools held unconstitutional by the same margin and the use of state funds for
field trip transportation held unconstitutional by a five to four majority); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (textbook loans to students of sectarian schools upheld by a six to three
majority and state-provided auxiliary services and instructional material and supplies invalidated by the same margin).
81. 444 U.S. at 662.
82. See Regan, 444 U.S. at 663-64 (Blackmun J., dissenting); see also supra note 79.
83. See Urofsky, Mr. Justice Powell and Education: The Balancing of Competing Values, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 581, 581 (1984) ("With the Court frequently split five to four on school
cases, Powell is often the swing vote, and even when in the minority, his dissenting opinions
have exerted significant influence on later decisions.").
84. Justice Powell has been in the majority of most school aid opinions, whether the
majority approved or disapproved parochial school aid. Because his decisions appear to be
ambiguous, it is instructional to compare them. Justice Powell has favored: tax relief for
families of students attending nonpublic schools, Mueller, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); parochial
school reimbursement for state-mandated testing, Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); textbook
loans to parochial school students, state provided standardized tests and test scoring services to nonpublic schools, diagnostic services performed at nonpublic school facilities, therapeutic services provided for nonpublic school students at public facilities, and state-funded
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Court decisions will reveal whether Aguilar has indeed neutralized

Regan, or if Regan is merely waiting for a school aid program that
Justice Powell finds acceptable.
When viewed in isolation, Aguilar v. Felton appears to be a
major victory for the proponents of strict entanglement analysis.
When viewed in its historical context, however, its relevance is not
so clear. Undoubtedly, time will tell whether Aguilar is indeed a
meaningful return to the strict Lemon entanglement doctrine-or
whether it is merely another example of the Justices' ad hoc determination of how much aid is too much.
RAYMOND

L.

ROBIN

field trip transportation for nonpublic schools, Wolman, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), and Meek, 421
U.S. 349 (1975). On the other hand, Justice Powell has opposed: remedial services provided
by public employees at nonpublic schools, Aguilar, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985); state-funded after-school instruction by nonpublic school teachers at religious school facilities, Ball, 105 S.
Ct. 3216 (1985); state-provided instructional material and equipment to parochial schools,
Wolman, 433 U.S. 229, and Meek, 421 U.S. 349; and therapeutic services performed at nonpublic schools by public employees, Meek. With the exception of the field trip transporation
issue in Wolman, Justice Powell has been in the majority in all of the above decisions. He
also indicated in his concurring opinion in Aguilar that he does not read Aguilar to preclude
all further parochial school aid. 105 S. Ct. at 3241-42 (Powell, J., concurring).

